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(i) 
CLARIFICATION OF PARTIES AND FACTS 
Parties: In discussing the case, respondents1 brief has at 
various times referred to the wrong party oi entity, apparently 
through inadvertance, but extensive enough to perhaps cause some 
confusion. For example, on page 33, respondents state that "... 
Amenity presented some self serving evidence...", and on page 26 
that "...Amenity received the value...", and on page 25, "... 
whether the distribution of stock by Amenity was a disposition 
for value." Such misstatements in respondents1 brief may not be 
material in all instances, but it was felt pertinent to call 
attention to the fact that Capital General Corporation and not 
Amenity is the party to this appeal; and that it was Capital 
General Corporation who distributed the stock by way of gift and 
who allegedly received value therefrom, and its vice president 
testified at the hearing, not Amenity, etc. Nor is the appellant 
corporation a "he" or a "his" notwithstanding various such 
designations in respondents1 brief. 
Facts: It appears appellant was wrong in its footnote on 
page 4 of its brief in predicting that respondents would not deny 
the stipulation reached at the first hearing June 19, 1986. 
Respondents' brief has denied not only the stipulation, but that 
such hearing even occurred. Counsel for respondents acknowledges 
that he was not counsel at the time of the hearing, but instead 
of inquiring of prior counsel who was present at the hearing he 
cites R. 28 and 75 as proof that there was no hearing. On the 
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contrary these pages in the record support appellant's claim that 
a hearing was held. R. 75 is a notice of the hearing, and there 
is nothing in the record or otherwise to indicate it was ever 
cancelled or continued to a different date. R. 28 is the first 
page of the findings and recommendations of the administrative 
law judge, dated October 28, 1986, and the second line has refer-
ence to the missing stipulation in that it states that counsel 
for the respective parties "agreed" to submit the matter on 
memoranda. The administrative law judge must have obtained the 
facts for his findings of fact (R. 28,29) from said "agreed" 
upon stipulation since no evidence had been presented by anyone 
up to that time. Even respondents' brief (page 34) refers to the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing as "additional" 
evidence, indicating their knowledge that there had been some 
prior time that evidence was received, i.e. the stipulation. 
Clearly respondents' denial of the occurrence of the hearing 
and stipulation is irresponsible. Respondents are empowered to 
hold hearings before themselves and are charged with keeping 
accurate records of such proceedings. Having failed to do so 
with respect to the said June 19, 1986 hearing, and thereafter 
trying to cover it up by claiming it didn't occur (even though 
Said facts, though not word for word, follow pretty closely the 
stipulation which is further indication of its existence. 
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t h e record i s r e p l e t e with c o r r o b o r a t i v e r e f e r e n c e s ) , would make 
one wonder how r e sponden t s can keep a s t r a i g h t face whi le a c c u s -
ing someone e l s e of bad f a i t h . 
Appe l l an t i s confused, t o say the l e a s t , a t the mot ives of 
r e sponden t s 1 in t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s m a t t e r in t h e i r b r i e f . 
At the top of page 5, a p p e l l a n t i s c r i t i c i z e d for f a i l i n g t o 
o b j e c t p r e v i o u s l y , and a t t he bottom of t h e same page , r e spon -
d e n t s say t h a t a p p e l l a n t could not have ob j ec t ed i f i t had wanted 
to (with a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d ) . In r e s p o n s e , a p p e l l a n t would c a l l 
a t t e n t i o n t o the comments of counsel for a p p e l l a n t a t the beg in -
ning of the only ev iden tua ry hea r ing t h a t was ever held (R. 118, 
page 15) which show a s p i r i t of c o o p e r a t i o n and t h a t a p p e l l a n t 
See also R. 118 at 3, 4 and 15 for unchallenged references to the f i r s t 
hearing which respondents now deny occurred, and there are others. See also 
R. 78 where respondents admit at least to an "informal meeting" at which sane-
thing was "agreed" between the partie's. I t was because such admissions were 
equivocal that counsel in his Distr ict Court memorandum challenged respondents 
to s ta te their position with respect to the stipulation unequivocally and 
offered to submit affidavits if respondents were to deny i t . Attached to said 
memorandum was another copy of the written stipulation, and i t would be pre-
sently part of the record on appeal but for the fact that the Salt Lake County 
Clerk's Office has misplaced the entire memorandum. Personnel in the Clerk's 
office are presently looking for i t , and appellant intends to submit another 
copy if they are unsuccessful. In any event, in respondents' responsive 
memorandum in the Distr ict Court, respondents' former counsel did not deny the 
stipulation, but did disagree with sane of the factual matters contained in i t 
based on what he considered conflicting facts which came out of the January 
20, 1987 evidenitary hearing. Appellant, in i t s s t i l l ever persevering sp i r i t 
of cooperation, does not object to such as i t has r^ever intended to prevent 
any facts from being considered. To remedy respondents' said failure to keep 
a proper record, attached to this reply brief as an addendum is a current 
affidavit of counsel for appellant respecting the occurrence of said hearinq 
and the proceedings thereat. 
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was willing to provide any information requested and answer any 
questions any of the respondents or their counsel may wish to 
ask. In other words, there has never been an attempt on appel-
lant's part to limit respondents only to the evidence in the 
stipulation. Appellant's posture and attitude from the beginning 
has been, and still is, that it has wanted the ruling on the 
merits, not on technicalities or by taking advantage of the 
opponent's mistakes. Furthermore, because appellant has had no 
reason to know that respondents failed to retain the said written 
stipulation in the record, it has had no reason to protest such 
failure or make specific statements or introduce evidence in 
later portions of the record to establish it or its contents, 
etc. Having personally handed the written stipulated facts to 
the Division when it held its first hearing June 19, 1986, how 
was counsel possibly to know that the Division was going to fail 
to put it in the record or deny that it occurred. 
Respondents' brief wonders of what impact is the missing 
stipulation since appellant does not seek to limit respondents 
only to those facts. The answers are: 
1. The written stipulation of facts received on June 19, 
1986 and discussed in some detail at that time was part of an 
opinion of counsel, one of two received by appellant, discussing 
statutes and precedents indicating there is no registration 
requirement respecting the gifted shares. This, in corroboration 
with appellants testimony at the later evidentiary hearing that 
it sought and followed the advice of counsel (R. 17), totally 
does away with respondents' bad faith argument as it establishes 
an intent to comply with the law and a belief that it had. 
2. Appellant should not be limited to facts received subse-
quent to the stipulation, as it relied on said document being 
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part of the record as represented by respondents on June 19, 
1986. There were no subsequent facts adduced inconsistent with 
the stipulation or which are damaging to appellant's postion, but 
that isn't reason to omit part of the record. Respondents don't 
believe this anywayf and it appears they have sought to exclude 
it because of inconsistencies they perceivej. 
3. Respondents1 discussion of this point is obviously aimed 
at casting doubt on appellant's credibility, but the attempted 
cover up has only cast doubt on their own. While appellant's 
failure to object earlier is due to the fact it didn't know the 
document had been omitted and because of its cooperative spirit 
in supporting the inclusion of all material evidence, respondents 
have little more to say in defense of their failure to meet their 
obligation of keeping accurate records of their proceedings than 
that if appellant doesn't ] ,i ke i t, it car i si le (Respondents' brief 
at page 6). 
Discussion of factual clarifications to this point has 
ce? • r-' .'•- ts1 omissions from the record - - footnote 1 
on page 7 ui respondents' brief, there is again . . 
respondents1 part to cast doubts on : ne -r-aioil I L ; at\d character 
of appell - * line in1 br inuing in 
materials admittedly outside or trie record. Appellant10 response 
to So ' ' ootnute is r
 ldr. si; . * : se . • • nere were iPor> Mia' 30 
companies, bit appel, J; • . , .* >.>\ 
based jn t; r, muer . i companies indicated in the record at • e 
Di /is , uiu counsel fo- appellant was 
not awari- t-.at ti.ti'.- *-I.M - .IK : - IUM in companies. ^ is seen 
from ' - *• ^  transcript, the president of appellant *ho id 
attended the - - r ior 1: lear ii lgs , was r IC t present -. • * - • • 
ne- employee wu-: present i o respond to the questions of respon-
c- • . ui companies. The correct information was 
evidently *. • N:,.;WI. °aid employee and it definitely was never 
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conveyed to counsel, a rather innocent situation to be sure since 
the number of companies doesn't matter anyway. But it can be 
seen that respondents cannot resist a personal attack after 
discovering there were more than 30 companies. Perhaps it never 
occurred to respondents in their drafting of said footnote that 
counsel for appellant was relying on the record and had no reason 
to question it. 
The comments in said District Court brief are still appro-
priate even though it turned out the numbers were wrong. This is 
because the number of companies is simply not relevant, and 
respondents' preoccupation with high numbers, as is again indi-
cated in said footnote, shows their insensitivity to the real 
issues of the case. The conduct of appellant in the gifting of 
shares in Amenity is either legal or it isn't, and if it's legal 
with one company, it's legal with 10 or 50, etc. If there is no 
speed limit, as was the case in parts of Nevada prior to the 
energy crunch, it matters not if one travels fast one time or a 
hundred times. Instead of discussing irrelevant numbers, appel-
lant would direct attention to the real issues of the case. 
These have to do with the rights of citizens in reading statutes 
to rely on their plain meanings in conducting their affairs, and 
the obligations of legislatures to define with clarity what is 
against the law, and the obligations of regulating agencies to 
follow those plain meanings the same as is expected of the 
citizens. 
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respondents to nave 
mentioned the material in said footnote 1 which is outside of the 
r'pci-rj, "lire aqa in i n the spirit of cooperation, appe.icj : u* : 
not object ai 1 d wou 1 d i 1 ot object t• : i%<iinhn 1 n * • • es 
with the present one •...• is particularly; advantageous T > 
appelluul, if -^ht these other cases 
up, because at trie ia< r_jai .-,*-L *p i .. ... other cases, unl . .i .:ie 
preset it ibe cue pcetni«"iL ^J. c - jp!-*-i» HI** was present .% .a 
testified, sheddinq f . n.'T^r lip ' • M •- ' • -
appeiLane'^ conduct , V:\KUM\\\ -H-- L .-• ' m a t ia aouit IU-J 
see- .. '• • - ^ yift;s rit Cdj i^i respon-
dents' offices and wd^ lnio^nieu Lhat Lr,p gifting of ;-.:.;. it 
require cey. -••-r st-ior- ^.at >-. >t : dined "no action" Letters 
from other ..?.ati^ L-><.. . , • . 
of stock witnout registrar i., -t^. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In appellan*-'- oript riled Feuruat 5, 1988, appellant 
established t : . i - • .--/<- t dl 
of the decision belov * re rjrbt issue, wheth-. „-, * 
tlt'Hh Uniform b«cuLxLie& A*" ipplies *;•> gifts, appellant .ittc 
several precedents on the .-i 
t • ippel ;ar -M A stated that respondent n ^ *,, * produce 
* - r/ |i.u isdii't ion ui - - J ^ ^ icies xctws /aere 
gifts had been considered sales. Respondents have not met U le 
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challenge. Instead they have made unsupported assertions in 
attempting to cast doubts on the authorities cited by appellant, 
and they have cited cases, not having anything to do with gifts, 
about how securities laws are to be liberally construed, etc., 
but they have failed to grasp the real issue and attack it. 
With respect to the second issue, that of the good or bad 
faith nature of appellant's gifts, in response to appellant's 
challenge to show even one shred of evidence of appellant's bad 
faith, respondents state only that the "good faith and sincerity 
of the giver" is not what counts. No facts are offered, and the 
bad faith finding is still a mere supposition and unsupported 
conclusion. Respondents' bad faith argument is nothing more than 
saying that the lack of registration is in and of itself the 
evidence of intent to violate the law, but without establishing 
it is against the law or that there was any intent to violate the 
law. Nor did respondents' brief refute the evidence presented on 
good faith. 
Response to appellant's third point, that respondents have 
no statutory authority to bring an action under §14 for a viola-
tion of the registration requirements of §7, was not even 
attempted by respondents. Respondents have evidently misunder-
stood appellant's argument in this regard, as they spent the 
portion of their brief in response to it supporting the doctrine 
that respondents have been given statutory authority to issue 
summary orders prior to a hearing, something appellant has made 
-8-
• .r. ion . •'. 7 ;^ "hrust of appellant's argument is that even 
-» e wdb d viuldtion o t § /, the decision be 1 ow must be 
reversed because respondents proceeded 11 i< :ie:i : I: I: e A :i : • : i g 3 EJ :::t :i c , 
that : - . - • • proceeded does no-: jr;arv = hem 
aul * *T< ! . d violation oi $/, but 
only for a . o u t i u n * > Since there was no summary order in 
this case u> J.I questi< ^ ->• out respondents* datricriw ti is > .e 
such, respondents ;, ^ n < 
attempt ^> i .;«-;- at" <MV I i trom ?•*< - , os.jfr - complete 
la< 
Instead <jt ueiin responsive to the specific oases . i 
in the case^ reporter appellant's brief ana statutes :r.c other 
authorities, re:. . . - .. , 
their arguments W I L L ^-»^.ndi attacks ^ iiidceadm • u L ^ a t ut 
t * -• , i -
 s yea numerous suppositions arid •.':• >n ject • ir^ of 
things w h i o cat* neither trup ">f : » record* 
do *ifi r ^ • -"i\ issues of tr.iH case, 'vi\e only CD^i.i.- - t .. be 
c . i rii.Dic cue cone , *- of 
appellant, • t *- iupeiianc acted ; r-- - faith r and :::\ere 
were a violation the specific remed' drtempteo oy respondent- is 
not author i z ed by L i i < • b I a 1, ml '
 : ; .• •-*.* • - • 
three )f tnesn point-, .. *-e ^st abi is*, ing -.M an^ one w-- ;i = •. 
lie qui • - • n below. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS1 POINT I: 
RESPONDENTS1 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE 
UNSUPPORTED AND UNREASONABLE. 
Appellants do not take issue with the quoted language of 
Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, 74 4 P.2d 
320f (Utah App. 1987) to the effect that the decisions of respon-
dents' should be reversed if they are outside the "tolerable 
limits of reason." However, respondents are attempting to estab-
lish by said case that the definition of "sale" or "sell" is 
"special law" and that therefore the respondents can place 
whatever meaning on it they may determine in the exercise of 
their "expertise." 
Respondents' failure to follow the plain meaning of the 
statutes is in and of itself outside of the tolerable limits of 
reason and is against the law. Respondents have not taken issue 
with the numerous authorities cited in Point I of appellant's 
brief that courts must follow the plain meaning of the words used 
in statutes, but they seek to overcome such by the simple exped-
iency of the "special law" doctrine. Should agencies (which do 
not have the status of either courts or legislatures) be under 
any lesser standard than the courts in being required to follow 
the plain meaning of the words used? To accept a yes answer 
ignores the fact that the reason for the plain meaning doctrine 
in the first place was not that courts lack the "expertise" of 
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agencies and therefore aren't qualified to make the interpreta-
tions, but that the rights of the citizens who read and rely on 
the plain meaning of the words must be protected. 
The obvious logic that agencies are under no less an 
obligation than courts to follow the plain meaning of legislative 
pronouncements is fully backed up by numerous precedents. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Olson Construction Company v. State Tax 
Commission, 361 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1961), at page 1113, stated that 
an administrative interpretation "contrary to the express pro-
visions of a statute cannot be given weight and, to do so, would 
in effect amend the statute." (Citations to other cases). That 
such is the law is so obvious that no doubt one could find a 
similar quote in many cases in every state in the country. See 
for example Gibb v. Spiker 718 P.2d 1076 (Hawaii 1986) at page 
1079: "An agency statutory interpretation, though, cannot 
contradict the clear statutory language..." and State Department 
of Social and Health Services v. Island County Juvenile Court, 
740 P.2d 907 (Wash. App. 1987) at page 911: "There is no need 
for deference to an agency's interpretation if the statute is not 
ambiguous." 
This latter quotation perhaps best harmonizes the claims of 
the appellant and the respondents with respect to statutory 
interpretation by administrative agencies, that is, deference to 
agency interpretation is indeed the correct rule of law, but it 
comes into play only if it is first made to appear that the words 
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used by the legislature are ambiguous. It is obvious there is 
nothing ambiguous in the words "sell" or "give" and hence no 
deference is due to the agency's interpretation of "sell" to 
include "give." 
Technomedical Labs, Inc. supra, is not out of harmony with 
the above reasoning. In discussing special law the Court des-
cribes it as those terms that bespeak a legislative intent to 
delegate their interpretation to the responsible agency. There 
is nothing in this statute that indicates an intent to delegate 
the definition of word "sell" to respondents. The legislature 
has chosen a well understood word to begin with and in addition 
has defined it in the statute and provided examples. This shows 
an intent to establish the statute's meaning by the words used, 
and not to leave any of it for respondents or anyone else to 
interpret. 
In a further attempt to support their position in this 
regard, Respondents have quoted the title of the Act and emphas-
ized certain provisions therein, but none of the quoted material 
(respondents' brief, p. 13) has anything to do with the claimed 
right of respondents to alter the plain meaning of the words 
"sale" or "sell" by the use of alleged "expertise." For example, 
the portion underlined by respondents merely indicates that the 
changes enacted in 1983 modified prior definitions, not that 
respondents have such authority. 
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POINT II. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II: 
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT IS IN 
HARMONY WITH THE POSITIONS ESPOUSED BY APPELLANT AND 
NOT WITH THOSE ESPOUSED BY RESPONDENTS. 
Respondents seek to overcome the clear wording of the 
statutes by use of the "legislative purpose^' doctrine. Appellant 
has no disagreement with the general statements found in numerous 
cases, one of which is quoted in respondent^1 brief, to the 
effect that securities laws are remedial in nature and should be 
broadly and liberally construed to give effect to the legislative 
purpose, that such laws are to prevent fraud, encourage the 
disclosure of information and protect investors from sales of 
fraudulent and worthless securities, etc. But none of that has 
anything to do with this case. There is no allegation of fraud 
or worthlessness or speculativeness of the securities in this 
case, and there are no investors. This casje involves whether a 
citizen of this state is allowed to give away securities without 
registration, or to be more specific, does §7 of the Act prohibit 
it. Yet respondents can't resist references to things like 
"ingenious subterfuge by fraudulent means" (page 15), etc., all 
of which are impertinent and introduced as inuendos against 
appellant's character to take attention away from said real issue 
of the case. 
In Point II respondents have discussed the various provi-
sions of the Act with respect to registration and point out that 
registration provides protection not only for initial purchasers 
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of the issue, but also subsequent purchasers. Respondents1 have 
not argued that the registration of gifted stock is needed to 
protect the giftees, but that the registration provisions of the 
Act show a purpose that such gifts be registered in order to 
protect subsequent purchasers. Instead of accepting such 
unsupported speculation, appellant would urge the Court that the 
purpose of any act can best be determined by careful study of its 
provisions and tnat respondents' analysis of the Act, while 
referring to some of the relevant provisions, is incomplete and 
misleading. Appellant will supplement it as follows: 
Section 61-1-11(8) of the Act is the key section for an 
understanding of the interaction between the registration process 
and the exemption process in secondary trading situations. Said 
subsection 8, cited by respondents, establishes that a registra-
tion expires in one year. That is, anyone selling stock who com-
plies with §7, i.e., registers the stock with the Division, will 
still be in violation of §7 if he makes sales beyond the one year 
period (unless of course he comes within an authorized exemption 
under §14). In other words, after a year is up the stock is in 
the same situation as if it had not been registered. As was 
pointed out in appellant's brief on page 33, §7 is an either/or 
statute, i.e., to sell stock one must either register it or come 
within one of the exemptions under §14. There is no other way 
one can sell stock under the statutory scheme of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. And §11(8) establishes that the registration 
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aspect is only valid for one year, and that thereafter all sales 
come under §14. 
So this matter is really quite simple if one will take the 
time to read the statutes. Pursuant to the either/or language of 
§7, one must comply with §§8, 9 or 10 cited by respondents on 
registrations of stock (the either), or with §14 (the or) for 
unregistered stock, which includes both stock which has never 
been registered and previously registered stock after its one 
year registration expires. Sales of a stock which has never been 
registered must fit within one of the exemptions in §14 from day 
one whereas sales of previously registered stock need do so only 
after the one year period. 
Now that this is all clear, it can easily be seen that while 
it cannot be denied that registrations also protect subsequent 
purchasers, it is equally obvious that the converse is not true, 
i.e. that there must be registration or secondary purchasers will 
be left unprotected. This is because §14 is to protect purchas-
ers of all unregistered stock, and it does not apply to any stocK 
that is registered. Clearly there is no other way to interpret 
the statutory scheme and the legislative intent other than that: 
1. Protection is provided to secondary purchasers (as 
well as original purchasers) of registered stock for the first 
year by the registration statements under §§8, 9 and 10 and 
supplements to it under §11(9), and after the first year by the 
exemptions under §14, and 
2. Secondary purchasers (as well as original pur-
chasers) of unregistered stock are protected under the exemptions 
under §14 at any time, including the first year. 
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Therefore respondents' claim that because the gifted stock 
is not registered, secondary purchasers do not nave the benefit 
of the protection they would have had for the first year had it 
been registered is begging the question. The problem in respon-
dents1 argument is that §14 does not require that secondary 
purchasers of stock (now remember, §14 exemptions have applica-
tion only to unregistered stock), whether previously registered 
or not, receive prospectus type information, i.e. the fact they 
donft receive it is statutorily approved (provided it fits a §14 
exemption). Such claim of respondents1, tnough correct, is not 
an argument against appellant's position but merely a correct 
statement of how the statute works. 
Respondents' are saying in effect that since the same kind 
of protection for the first year as would be provided in a 
registration statement is not provided in the present case, the 
registration provisions must apply. But that totally ignores the 
language of §7 which says you can sell stock either/or, i.e., 
either if it registered, or if it comes within an exemption. 
Respondents are reading into the statute that either/or means 
either registration or exemption after first registering and the 
registration has expired. But not only is such totally contrary 
to the wording of §7, there is nothing anywhere in the Act that 
states, implies or suggests that the exemptions of §14 were to 
apply only to stocks that had been previously registered, and its 
specific provisions overwhelmingly indicate to the contrary. To 
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tw i s t the s t a tu to ry scheme and spec i f i c provision as respondents 
have done i s c l ea r ly beyond the " to l e rab le l im i t s of reason." and 
in fact i t i s much worse than t h a t i J 
Respondents have sought to advance t h e i r pos i t ion by 
suggesting tha t the requirements under §14 are not r igorous 
enough to be adequate p ro tec t ion to inves tors in the secondary 
market. They say tha t the r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements in the Act 
are very de ta i l ed and provide fu l l d i s c l o s u r e , whereas the 
information requirements under §14 are l imited and therefore a 
I 
company l ike Amenity, if the lower c o u r t ' s decis ion i s reversed, 
wi l l be a bad thing for secondary purchasers because of the lack 
of more de ta i l ed information about the s tock. If indeed i t i s 
t rue tha t §14 information requirements are d e f i c i e n t , the obvious 
remedy for tha t i s for the l e g i s l a t u r e to beef up the r equ i re -
ments of §14, not for respondents to disregard i t s provis ions and 
i n t e r ac t i on with the e i t h e r / o r provis ions of §7. Furthermore, 
the same c r i t i c i s m (if t rue a t a l l ) would apply to any reg i s te red 
company beyond the f i r s t year . That i s , j u s t because more com-
p le t e information was provided i n i t i a l l y , the s t a t u s of p a r t i c -
ular companies, i . e . , t h e i r f inancia l s i t u a t i o n , t h e i r o f f i c e r s , 
I t doesn't help respondents' position (but may confuse, hence this 
footnote) for them to say (p.18) the disclosure required by §14 is an update 
of the prior disclosure under a registration. Although i t may have that 
effect in a particular instance, there's nothing in the statute that states or 
implies exclusiveness of application to the type of unregistered stock wnich 
was previously registered. Nor, in view of the clear and unequivocal 
either/or operation of §7, can such be presumed. 
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all of the other information cited in respondents' brief that 
must be supplied in registration statements, etc. sometimes 
changes rather rapidly, and after the first year when the secon-
dary purchasers have only the protection of $14, such purchasers 
are no better off because the company was initially registered 
than they would be in a case like Amenity where the stock was 
originally gifted and not registered, i.e., the more detailed 
information furnished some time ago, whicn may have no resemo-
lance to current information, would be useless. 
In summary, the either/or statutory scheme enacted by the 
legislature provides such protections to purchasers as is desired 
by the legislature. Clearly such legislative scheme establishes 
that the vast majority of protection of secondary purchasers in 
all companies is provided in the §14 exemptions, the only excep-
tion being the first year for registered stock. The reasoning 
for that exception is also clear: the legislature does not deem 
the §14 provision to be adequate protection to initial purchasers 
of a public offering. Why? Because these people are paying 
their cash to a new untried enterprise, which also establisnes 
why §7 doesn't apply to gifts - because those people aren't pay-
ing anything. And even though appellant acknowledges that regis-
tration statements sometimes do provide information to secondary 
purchasers during the first year, it is obvious (again, if one 
will take the time to read the statute) that the purpose of the 
one year provision, §11(8), and the very next subsection (9) 
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requiring supplemental information during the one year, is that 
it takes about that long in many cases to sell out the issue to 
the initial purchasers, and the possibility of it also providing 
information to secondary purchasers during that year is only 
incidental, if it was thought of at all by the legislature. 
A careful reading of the argument in Point II of respon-
dents1 brief will show that such argument has accomplished 
nothing mpre than inform readers that the statutory provisions 
are inadequate to accomplish their desires in this particular 
case and not that the failure to register the gifted stock 
violates the purpose of the securities laws. Furthermore, the 
suggestion of respondents respecting deficiencies in the protec-
tions of §14 are mere unverified assertions anyway. It is true 
they are less demanding than the registration provisions, but the 
legislature apparently feels they are adequate. The parade of 
horrors in respondents1 brief of possible scenarios relating to 
donees trying the sell their stock and other things is just so 
much speculation and not based on any facts in or out of the 
record. Specifically, with respect to the speculation in foot-
note 3 on page 19, it is clear that even if such were the case, 
respondents have their remedy and could bring an action to 
suspend the trading if it did not come within a §14 exemption as 
therein speculated. But that is not what respondents are 
attempting to do here. (See Point III of 4ppellantfs brief). 
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Another problem with respondents1 conclusion and the 
speculative parade of horrors used to support it is that while 
their point was that the gift distribution violated the purposes 
of the Actf i.e. that the gifting of stock by appellant is an 
evil the legislative purpose is against, they failed to respond 
to appellant's point on pages 29 and 30 of its brief, that when 
the speculation has been put aside, there are no facts to show 
that any secondary purchaser of the gifted stock has made any 
complaint or has been hurt or has needed protection some two 
years after the gifts took place. And if there were an evil, 
appellant respectfully submits that the American way is to 
legislate it away with clear and unmistakable language rather 
than do violence to the language not only of the specific 
section, §7, but the entire statutory scheme. 
POINT III. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS NOT ANl 
OFFER OR SALE. 
Appellant agrees it made offers of stock to the giftees, but 
not for value. Appellant does not dispute that "sale" is broader 
as used in securities laws than in commercial transactions. It 
is obvious from the legislative enactment that the Utah Legisla-
ture considered it to be broader because it defined specific 
examples - some of which in commercial usage might be called a 
trade or something else. These examples, however, listed in 
§13(15)(c), clearly show the intent of the lawmakers was only to 
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make it clear that anything which exacted value from the recip-
ient would be considered a salef not that gifts would be consid-
ered sales, as argued by respondents. Every single itemized 
example in the Utah Act is an example where the recipient pro-
vides some value. Such is totally consistent with appellant's 
brief in which it was pointed out on pages 13 and 14 that the 
obvious difference between a gift and a sale is that even though 
a gift also provides something for the giver that it connotes a 
bargain and a contractually agreed upon consideration, i.e., 
value provided by the recipient for the stock, whether it be in 
connection with a bonus or an assessment or some other trade of 
property from the recipient. Further, since the legislature 
decided to list examples of "gifts" which are sales, the fact the 
legislature did not list the type of gifts in this case conclu-
sively establishes that such are not to be considered as sales. 
That this cannot be refuted is seen in the fact that the two 
examples of "gifts" cited by respondents (315(15)(c)(i) a bonus 
and (ii) assessable stock) are not gifts at all but are merely 
ways of exacting a purchase price from the recipient. 
Respondents have relied upon two Federal spin-off cases to 
the effect that the value need not flow directly from the recip-
ient in order to constitute the value required to make a "dispos-
ition for value," and hence, a sale. Sinc^ appellant admits it 
received benefit (though not from the recipients) from making the 
gifts, it is argued that these cases are controlling. However, 
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it is readily apparent that the spin-off cases are distinguish-
able as having nothing to do with gifting of stock. In the 
present case the benefits received by appellant are only 
incidental to the gifts, i.e., not directly related, could have 
been received in a different way, were speculative, i.e., only 
hoped for, and the recipients paid nothing for the gifts, i.e. 
had no investment or contract rights. In contrast, in the spin-
off cases, the recipients of the stock had paid something for the 
right to receive the stock (their initial purchase of stock), and 
so even though there is discussion in the cases about that value 
accruing to the defendants, such as the enhanced value of a 
public company, such value could never have arisen or be discuss-
ed at all had not the recipients purchased stock in the parent 
company which entitled them contractually to their pro rata snare 
of the spin-off stock. That is no different than the bonus situ-
ation is under §13(15)(c)(i) of the Utah Act, i.e., the original 
purchase of stock in the parent company entitled the purchaser to 
the "bonus" of the stock of the subsidiary. Under those facts 
the recipient still paid value for both stocks, and it was there-
fore not necessary for those courts to do as much violence to the 
English language to determine that the distribution of the stock 
was a sale. In stark contrast, in the present case there is no 
relation at all between the recipients of the stock and any value 
or purchase they may have made to the ultimate benefit to 
appellant. 
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In summary, although respondents have cited both cases and 
statutes, neither involve true gifts as those in the present case 
are acknowledged to be, and in both the statutory and case law 
examples cited by respondents the recipients did in fact pay for 
their shares. 
Next, respondents suggest that the authorities cited by 
appellant in its brief are not valid as precedents. The devast-
ating effects to respondents1 position coming from the case of 
Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938, (Utah 1935) are such that respon-
dents took no less than five pages to respond to this one case to 
attempt to show that it was not analogous or applicable. In 
attempting to do this respondents have made unsupported state-
ments such as, "neither the aim nor the effect of the distribu-
tion was to create a publicly held company." It doesn't matter 
whether it was or not, because there is nothing in the statute 
which would make §7 apply differently if the aim or effect
 was 
to create a publicly held company. So this misstatement ot 
respondents' is perhaps not relevant, but it's another example of 
their attempts to confusion the issues. Nevertheless, in 
response appellant would point out that such information as 
asserted by respondents is not found in the Andrews opinion, and 
the implication therein is strictly to the contrary since the 
Further, there is nothing in the record to support respondents' asser-
tion on page 22 that the purpose of appellant's gift distribution was to create 
a public company. That was, however, one of the effects, among many others. 
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gifts were "...to such members of the public as would receive 
it " 2£ a t Pa9e 939. 
Respondents1 chief argument against Andrews i s t h e i r claim 
tha t the 1963 Legis la ture overruled i t in enacting the Uniform 
S e c u r i t i e s Act. There are l o t s of reasons why t h i s i s n ' t so . To 
begin with, i t s t r e t c h e s the imagination to suggest t ha t some 
t h i r t y years l a t e r in the adoption of a uniform act prepared out-
s ide the Sta te by o thers there was any in ten t to consider the old 
1935 case a t a l l . More s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s the fact tha t 
the provis ion of the old s t a t u t e discussed in Andrews was not 
changed in the new enactment. The spec i f i c issue discussed in 
Andrews was whether the g i f t s cons t i tu ted a d i spos i t i on "for 
value" within the meaning of the s t a t u t e , and t ha t has not 
changed. The add i t iona l de f i n i t i on added in the 1963 t o t a l 
enactment of a new law did not change the basic "for value" 
requirement or af fect the v a l i d i t y of the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court quoted on page 17 of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f . I t merely 
carved out an exception for a "purported g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e 
s tock . " b Also of s ign i f icance i s tha t if the l e g i s l a t u r e 
Obviously there is no value paid for a gift of assessible stock unless 
and until the assessment is made and paid by the recipient. And equally 
obvious is that the legislature in 1963 simply decided that since such 
assessment would in al l likelihood be the intent of the distribution, i t might 
as well stop i t at the outset by carving out the exception and thus avoid the 
issue that was lost in Andrews. In reality, by carving out the exception, the 
legislature rather than overruling Andrews has acknowledged i t s correct 
application of the "for value" test , and hence the need to exempt assessible 
stock fron such test and simply define i t as a "sale." 
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in tended t h a t a pu rpo r t ed g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e s tock be a s a l e , 
what if i t i s a r e a l g i f t and not j u s t a "purpor ted" g i f t ? 
Fur the rmore , t he a s s e s s i b l e s tock in the Andrews case was only 
v o l u n t a r i l y a s s e s s i b l e . b But even wi thout g e t t i n g i n t o i s s u e s of 
whether i t was v o l u n t a r i l y a s s e s s i b l e or o t n e r w i s e , or whether i t 
was a pu rpor t ed g i f t or an a c t u a l g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k , t h e 
main flaw in r e s p o n d e n t s 1 a t t e m p t s t o d i s c r e d i t Andrews i s t h a t 
even i f the l e g i s l a t u r e d id in f a c t in tend t o o v e r r u l e the r e s u l t 
with r e s p e c t t o a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k , i t cannot p o s s i b l y have a f f e c t -
ed the more b a s i c hold ing t h a t "had the lawmaking power in tended 
Because of i t s significance to th is appeal and the conflicting claims of 
the par t ies , included in the addendum to th is reply brief i s the entire 
opinion in Andrews. Note the dissent ' s extensive discussion of the difference 
between normal assessible stock and the voluntary assessments there involved. 
This provides a better understanding into the unusual nature of the voluntary 
assessments, i . e . they were different than those exempted from the "for value" 
requirement by the 1963 legislature. 
In addition, although respondents quote and take comfort in the dissent 's 
statements, a reading of the entire dissent shows they have taken Justice 
Hanson's statements out of context, i . e . he does not question the present 
appellant 's position that the law does not apply to g i f t s , but he merely 
provides various reasons why he thinks the transfers of the assessible stock 
was not a gif t even in the ordinary plain meaning of the word. In the present 
case not even respondents challenge that appellant 's transfers were true gif ts 
under ordinary usage. So i t can be seen that if the present case were before 
the 1935 Supreme Court, whether before or after the 1963 enactment, there 
would be no dissent and Justice Hanson would go with the majority since none 
of the reasons he cited that the transfers of assessible stock are not true 
gi f ts are even remotely involved in the present case. 
See also the Supreme Court's arguments (at page 941) similar to those in 
appellant 's brief on page 20 (unresponded to by respondents) examining other 
provisions of the Act in concluding i t did not show a purpose to regulate 
g i f t s . Appellant recommends reading the entire case - i t may be an old one, 
but i t s doctrines are timeless and irrefutable. I t is on "all fours" with the 
present case, and i t has not been overruled. 
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the Act should apply to gifts of securities, it would have been a 
simple matter to have so provided," At best, the legislature has 
provided only that "purported gifts of assessible stock" are 
exempted from the said holding. Clearly, the legislature cannot 
overrule the holding in Andrews because it is based on such obvi-
ously correct principles and unchallenged authority, to-wit, that 
if a legislature is going to prohibit conduct, it is a simple 
matter to spell it out and their obligation is to do so in plain 
English so that people can understand it (see Point I of appel-
lant's brief and authorities there cited). To attempt to 
overrule that would be unconstitutional. 
The fact is, the Andrews case still stands firmly in place 
in support of appellant's position totally, whether or not the 
1963 amendment referred to by respondents can be considered as 
having changed the result of the case as applied to assessible 
stock. The fact that the legislature has determined that pur-
ported gifts of assessible stock should be registered is not 
support for the proposition that the gifts of Amenity stock 
should be registered, but on the contrary is further evidence 
that they should not, i.e., the fact that the legislature was 
specific with respect to the gifts of purported assessible stock 
eliminates other kinds of gifts of stock. Further, the fact that 
the 1983 amendment establishing that a purported gift of assess-
ible stock is a sale as part of the same amendment establishing 
that a good faith gift is excepted raises serious doubts as to 
-26-
respondents' entire good faith gift argument, i.e. it indicates 
that the good faith gift amendment was added to allow somebody to 
give assessible stock in good faith and not be accused of a 
7 
"purported gift." 
Respondents have suggested that the other cases cited by 
appellant in its brief are "wholly inapplicable." Appellant 
respectfully requests respondents to please read them again. 
Appellant cited a total of four cases, including the Andrews 
case, which dealt specifically with person^ giving away secur-
ities with the issue as to whether or not such was a violation of 
specific securities laws relating to the prohibition of sales of 
securities. If that is not applicable, appellant wonders what 
is. In contrast, respondent has not cited a single case that 
involves even remotely any gifts of securities. Respondents' 
brief gives as its "most compelling case" Technomedical Labs, 
Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, supra, but it has nothing to do 
with the giving of stock. But that's what the present case is 
about, i.e., does §7 of the Act prohibit the giving of stock 
without registration? Obviously the federal cases, Truncale v. 
Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S. Dist. N.Y. 1948) and Shaw v. 
Dreyfuss, 172 F.2d 140 (S. Cir. 1949) cited by appellant are 
This is logical because it would indeed be bad faith to give a 
"purported gift" of assessible stock with the intent to thereby exact 
consideration from the donee. It's not a real gift, it's a lie, and so it's a 
bad faith transfer. 
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based on a different statute other than §7 of the Utah Securities 
Act. But the issue is the same, i.e., the securities laws 
involved in those cases contain the same question, i.e., whether 
the gifts of securities constituted sales, and for respondents to 
style said cases as "wholly inapplicable" or not remotely related 
is further indication of respondents1 brief's consistent 
unsupported statements and attempts to confuse the real issue of 
the case. As an indication that respondents have not even read 
these cases they say don't apply, see top of page 32 of respon-
dents' brief in which respondents represent in their brief that 
Shaw involved gifts to charities, when in fact the case did not 
apply to charities, and the dissenting opinion specifically 
stated it did not (at page 143). Respondents have pointed out 
that those companies were already public companies, yet that 
doesn't seem to be material to anyone but respondents, i.e., the 
statute makes no distinction, etc. Nowhere in the statute or in 
the case law is there any provision establishing that an act 
which is otherwise legal under the statute, i.e., giving stock, 
becomes illegal within the provisions of the Act if the effect is 
to create a publicly held company. 
POINT IV. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV: 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART 
OF APPELLANT. 
Respondents' brief states on page 33, "The Act does not 
concern itself in this setting regarding good faith with the 
sincerity of the giver...." At page 24, appellant's brief 
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pointed out specific evidence in the record showing appellant1s 
good faith intent and that there was no contrary testimony 
introduced. In response respondents refuse to discuss the 
specific evidence but seek to avoid such by asserting that it 
doesn't matter about the good faith and sincerity of the giver! 
Arbitrary and capricious? You bet! In the above quoted 
admission, respondents have acknowledged that they ignored the 
evidence in the record and that no amount of evidence of the good 
faith of appellant would have been sufficient. 
Appellant has no disagreement with respondents1 definitions 
of good faith and citations therein. Nor does appellant dispute 
that if there is any evidence that appellant intended to evade 
the requirements of the law, appellant would be guilty of bad 
faith. But there isn't any such evidence. It accomplishes 
nothing for respondents to recite some of the factual history as 
they have done on pages 34 and 35 of their brief, as these are 
only inuendos at best and have no real bearing on the question of 
the good faith of appellant. While it is unclear just what point 
is being made of the fact for example that appellant received a 
fee for performing services (should they work for nothing?) and 
the other matters listed, it is clear that as pointed out in 
appellant's brief (p. 27) respondents' conclusions that appellant 
is guilty of bad faith are not based on the facts bearing on 
appellant's intent, but are based solely on the fact that there 
was no registration. That is, respondents have merely presumed 
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that no registration is irrefutably equated to bad faith. That 
such is arbitrary and capricious and severely restrictive of the 
rights of one attempting to comply with the law is obvious. Lack 
of registration of gifts does not amount to bad faith or any 
intent to circumvent any laws when the undisputed evidence in the 
record shows that the giver intended to comply with the law, 
sought legal advice, would have registered had it been advised to 
or believed that it was required, is still willing to register if 
such is the law, and had no intent whatever to do anything 
outside of the law. 
It is not known nor has it been stated whether or not the 
trading of the shares referred to in respondents1 brief was 
illegal, i.e., a violation of §14 of the Act, but if there were 
any trades that did not comply with §14, there is no evidence 
that it was the intent of appellant that such happen or that such 
would not have happened had there been a registration, and 
certainly respondents have a remedy to prevent such trades 
without the necessity of asserting the fiction that appellant is 
guilty of making bad faith gifts because they weren't registered. 
Contrary to respondents1 suggestion on page 35, there is 
nothing typical about a grandfather giving his grandson a stock 
certificate. Nor is there any indication that the statute was to 
apply to such to the exclusion of other good faith gifts. On the 
contrary, appellant is entitled to rely upon the wording of the 
statutes and the advice of counsel in determining whether or not 
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to register gifts of stock, and since the statutes clearly do not 
require such (or at the very least, and everyone should be able 
to admit this, do not appear to require such) respondents claim 
that failure to register displays an intent to evade the statu-
tory requirements is nothing but a circuitous argument and in 
reality is only a policy statement on the part of respondents 
that they would like to require gifts to be registered. But the 
decision in the case must rest upon the law and the facts, not on 
respondents1 desires. 
Once again, respondents fall back on their claim of exper-
tise and technical knowledge in this area of "special law" in 
drawing their conclusions. However, their findings and conclu-
sions are out of the tolerable limits of reason and are arbitrary 
and capricious because they ignore the statutes and the intent of 
appellant and simply conclude that because registration was not 
done there must have been some evil intent. That truly is 
arbitrary and capricious and is only in furtherance of their plan 
to create their desired result irrespective of the law and the 
facts. 
POINT V: APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS1 POINT V: 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT, POINT III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, THAT THE 
REMEDY SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
STATUTE. 
In respondents' discussion in Point V, the brief continues 
the pattern of attempting to confuse the real issues by bringing 
in allegations and speculations not in the record and other 
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unsupported assumptions and "parade of horrors" type statements 
without basis. It is unclear whether respondents1 discussion of 
irrelevant matters is to give the appearance of having answered 
the points of appellant without having done so or because of lack 
of understanding of such point. For example, respondents1 have 
stated that appellant has claimed that §14(3) can only be exer-
cised by them after the fact, i.e., that they can't shut the door 
to the hen house until all the chickens are out. Respondents 
have stated that appellant is "nonplused" and "dead wrong" (page 
42) and the brief goes on to spend a considerable amount of 
detail in setting appellant right. The problem with such is that 
appellant has never made any of those claims attributable to 
it! Of course appellant would be dead wrong if it claimed the 
respondents didn't have powers to summarily suspend exemptions 
under §14(3). Appellant has never suggested that it is nonplused 
at that type of authority, but it is now nonplused at 
respondents' having made such allegations and having felt the 
need to discuss it, particularly in light of the fact that no 
such summary order was ever issued in this case. 
Appellant does not question respondents' authority under 
§14(3) to issue summary orders suspending exemptions under §14. 
What appellant stated in its brief was that their ability to do 
so, whether it be a summary order or after a hearing, is 
dependent on a criteria and that criteria is whether or not the 
particular transaction or security being suspended in fact comes 
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within one of the described exemptions of §14. In this case, 
respondents have suspended the trading of Amenity, Inc. stock 
based on an alleged violation of §7. Assuming such a violation, 
nowhere in §14, subsection 3, or anywhere else in the statute is 
such authority given, whether summarily prior to a hearing or 
after three hearings as was done in this ca$e. As pointed out in 
the main brief, if there is any violation ot §7 by appellant in 
its gifting of stock, the remedy is provided in §§2U and 21 (see 
Point III of appellant's brief). Section 14 is limited to issues 
relating to §14 exemptions, and respondents nowhere in their 
pleadings or in their arguments have made ajiy claim that any 
exemptions have been violated. 
To be sure it is clear: Suppose ABC Company sold stock to 
the public for cash without registration in violation of §7. 
Respondents could bring severe punishments against ABC and its 
principles under §§20 and 21, but they can do nothing under 
§14. Not only is that the clear statutory language, but the 
reason for such is obvious. A suspension of exemptions under §14 
would only add further hurt to the very people the Act is to 
protect - first they unwittingly buy stock without the protec-
tions of registration, and now respondents are going to tell them 
they can't sell it even if exemptions under §14 are complied 
with! (See Point II above and Point III in appellant's brief). 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents have sought to sustain their position by 
personal attacks, inuendos and skirting the issues and discussing 
irrelevant and redundant material to take attention away from the 
real issues in the case. The real issues of the case involve the 
statutory authority of regulatory agencies, their right to alter 
the plain meaning of legislative enactments, go against estab-
lished precedents, etc. and the right of the public to be secure 
in relying on the English language, common meanings and prior 
precedents in interpretating statutes governing their conduct. 
Appellant once again, as a member of the public, asks the above 
Court for protection against respondents. Appellant's brief 
conclusively establishes that the conduct of appellant is not 
prohibited by statute, that it acted in good faith, and that even 
if there were violations the remedies sought by respondents is 
not authorized by statute. Respondents have failed to refute any 
one of these points. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1988. 
((b^$ \£L 
David H. Day f 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
and Appellant 
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I. Affidavit re June 19, 1986 hearing proceedings and 
stipulation. 
II* Andrews v. Chase opinion. 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
(ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
David H. Day, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
1. That he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah, and that he makes this affidavit as an officer of 
the Court to supply information relative to missing portions of 
the record in the appeal before the Court of Appeals of the State 
of Utah, Case No. 870567-CA 
2. That on or about the second week of June 1986 his client 
and appellant in said appeal, Capital General Corporation, 
presented him with a copy of a petition and notice of hearing on 
said petition, scheduled for June 19, 1986, before Stephen 
Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge, of the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation. A copy of said petition and notice of 
hearing is in the record in the said appeal, pages 73, 74 and 75. 
3. That he appeared at the time and place set ror said 
hearing with David R. Yeaman, president of appellant. Also 
present were Sherwood Cook of the Utah Securities Division and 
Nicholas E. Hales of the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
representing the Division. 
4. That the Division, through Mr. Hales and Mr. Cook, 
suggested that the matter could be handled on legal memoranda 
based on stipulated facts, provided that we could stipulate to 
the facts at such time, and if so, it would not be necessary to 
have the administrative law judge come down and be present, but 
he could decide it based on the said stipulated facts and written 
memorandums of law to be filed. 
5. That he presented a letter addressed to his said client 
from himself, dated February 13, 1986, and suggested to Mr. Cook 
and Mr. Hales that it was his understanding that the facts of the 
case were as represented on the first two pages of said letter. 
Mr. Yeaman affirmed that those were the facts, and he answered 
additional questions of Mr. Hales or Mr. Cook. Mr. Hales and Mr. 
Cook read said factual description and both indicated that that 
would be used as the stipulated facts and delivered to the 
administrative law judge. It was also agreed that the Division 
would file its memorandum first, the undersigned would file 
second, and the Division would file a reply, and dates were 
agreed upon for such filings. 
6. That he personally handed said stipulated facts to the 
Division's said representatives, with the understanding that such 
would become part of the record. That he had never at any time 
prior to the Final Order of the Department of Business Regula-
tion, dated February 18, 1987, had any indication from any 
attorney or other personnel of, or representing, the Division 
that such was not the case, and that he did not learn that it had 
apparently been omitted by the Division until after the Final 
Order was entered while preparing for the District Court review. 
-2-
7. That the second hearing held September 25, 1986, was not 
agreed to as part of the stipulation, as the stipulation original 
invisioned that the administrative law judge would make his 
ruling based on the written memorandums only. However, after 
reading the written memorandums, the undersigned requested the 
hearing which was granted by the law judge, which request is 
referenced in said administrative law judge's findings (R. 28). 
8. That the agreed upon facts in said stipulation are 
quoted on pages 3 and 4 of appellant's brief. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 1988. 
David H. Day *" 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
1988. 
this 4th day of April, 
My Commission Expires: Notary Publ: 
Residing in/ Slalt Lake City, Utah 
-3-
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signments as provided for in Paragraphs 4 
and 5 hereof." 
The defenses, based on this paragraph of 
the contract, were presented by a general 
demurrer to the complaint, which was 
overruled; by the second defense in the 
answer; by motion for nonsuit and motion 
for new trial. The substance of other ma-
terial parts of the contract is to the effect 
that plaintiff should give to defendant a 
complete list of all its customers, and on 
the first of each month a list of new cus-
tomers to whom oil was furnished the 
month preceding, and, at any time that de-
fendant felt insecure, defendant was en-
titled to an assignment of the accounts of 
plaintiff, and, if such assignment was not 
made, defendant could notify plaintiff's 
customers. 
From a casual reading of the contract, it 
is apparent that both parties realized the 
uncertainty of full performance and made 
provision therefor, in that certain bene-
fits were to inure to either party upon non-
performance by the other. The relative 
rights of the parties were determined by 
their own words of agreement in para-
graph 8, which undoubtedly were intend-
ed to, and do, control as to damages, if 
any. No other purpose would have called 
for such provisions of the contract, and, 
when so fixed and agreed upon, it was an 
establishment of the limitations of the 
benefits and liabilities, and the remedy thus 
provided is to the exclusion of all others. 
If these were improvident provisions of 
the contract, we cannot offer a substitute. 
Only a breach of these conditions or an 
interference with their performance would 
provide grounds for damage. From the 
record herein, we find that no such breach 
was alleged or proven. 
Plaintiff centered its cause of action up-
on paragraph 1 of the contract, and 
claimed its damages on the failure of de-
fendant to deliver. If this was the entire 
contract, a proper measure of relief might 
be available. Plaintiff cannot select cer-
tain portions of the contract, beneficial to 
it, to the exclusion of other provisions it 
had made and agreed upon. It is evident 
that the parties themselves understood the 
uncertainties surrounding the performance 
of this contract and meant by its provisions 
to allow for—upon consideration to be 
given—the failure of performance. This 
intent is so apparent from the contract 
€=>For other cases see same topic and KEY Ni 
iDotson v. Hoggan, 4 
that it controls its construction, and ef-
fect must be given to the document as a 
whole. 
Plaintiff, in failing to base its cause of 
action on the remedy provided in the con-
tract in case of nonperformance, failed to 
state a cause of action, and the demurrer 
of defendant to the complaint should have 
been sustained. 
Error has been assigned to the giving of 
alleged improper instructions and to fixing 
an erroneous measure of damage. In view 
of the conclusions above reached, it is un-
necessary to discuss these assignments. 
Judgment is reversed, with directions to 
sustain the demurrer, and for such further 
proceedings as may be proper in accord-
ance with the views herein expressed 
BOUCK, J., dissents. 
ANDREWS v. CHASE el al. 
No. 5504. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 25,1935. 
1. Statutes <S=>206 
In construction of statute, effect must be 
given to all language used in act when pos-
sible. 
2. Licenses $=9l8t/? 
Disposal of securities by gift held not 
within statute regulating sales of corporate 
securities (Laws 1925, c. 87, as amended). 
3. Corporations <§=>90(2) 
Where articles of incorporation provide 
that stockholders of corporation shall not 
be liable for corporate debts, owner of full 
paid stock is not liable for unpaid assessment, 
which can be enforced only by sale of stock 
or so much thereof as may be necessary to 
pay assessment.! 
4. Appeal and error €=»9I7(I) 
Supreme Court must assume truth of al-
legations of complaint for purpose of demur-
rer. 
5. Licenses €=»39 
Gift of corporation's stock to public with 
understanding that assessment would be lev-
MBER to all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
Utah, 295, 140 P. 12& 
ANDREWS 
49 P. 
ied for development of corporate assets, but 
that persons to whom stock was given were 
not obligated to pay such assessment, held not 
"sale" or "attempt to sell" stock within Se-
curities Act, and hence agreement with statis-
tician who was employed to assist in disposi-
tion of stock was not void under terms of Se-
curities Act (Laws 1925, c. 87, §f 2, 7, 10, 27). 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Sale/' see Words & Phrases.] 
6. Gifts <S=>5(2) 
Gift does not become sale merely because 
donor hopes to receive something for gift 
EPHRAIM HANSON, J., dissenting. 
v. CHASE 
(2d) Utah 939 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; James W. McKinney, Judge* 
Action by Hal Andrews against Ogden 
C. Chase and others. From a judgment 
dismissing the action, the plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed and remanded, with directions. 
Allen T. Sanford and E. A. Rogers, 
both of Salt Lake City, for appellant 
Van Cott, Riter & Farnsworth, Cheney, 
Jensen & Marr, and Ray McCarty, all of 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
ELIAS HANSEN, Chief Justice. 
In the court below defendants' demur-
rers to plaintiffs amended complaint were 
sustained. Plaintiff refused to further 
amend his complaint, whereupon defen-
dants moved to dismiss the action. The 
motion was granted and the action dis-
missedo Plaintiff appeals. He assigns as 
errors the order sustaining the demurrers 
and the order dismissing the action. It is 
in substance alleged in the complaint: That 
defendant companies are, and at all times 
alleged in the complaint were, Utah cor-
porations; that plaintiff is, and at all times 
alleged in the complaint was, a statistician, 
analyst, and adviser of the value of stocks, 
bonds, and various kinds of securities and 
as such engaged in business at Salt Lake 
City, Utah; that at the times complained 
of plaintiff had a list of numerous clients 
to whom he was, and for two years had 
been, sending weekly letters advising them 
of his opinion and analysis of mining stocks 
and other securities; that during the month 
of April, 1932, defendant Ogden C Chase 
was a director, secretary and treasurer, 
and defendant S. F. Hunt was a director 
ana the president, of defendant corpora-
tion Rio Tinto Copper Company. Para-
graph 4 of the amended complaint contains 
the allegations which form the basis for 
the questions which divide the parties. We 
quote it in full: 
"That on or about the 1st day of April, 
1931 the said defendant Rio Tinto Copper 
Company, was desirous of giving some of 
its shares of treasury stock to such mem-
bers of the public as would receive it, up-
on the understanding that the Rio Tinto 
Copper Company would for the purpose 
of carrying on development of said pro-
perty levy one two-cent assessment and 
three one-cent assessments, or as many 
thereof as might be necessary to finance 
the development of its mining property and 
with the understanding that the persons 
receiving said stock were not obligated to 
pay such assessments, or any of them, and 
on or about said date the said Rio Tinto 
Copper Company and the said Ogden C. 
Chase and said S. F. Hunt, knowing that 
the said plaintiff had a large number of 
clients residing outside of Utah who re-
posed confidence in the judgment of the 
plaintiff and who relied upon the advice 
of the plaintiff with reference to the value 
of mining stocks and other securities, en-
tered into an agreement with the said 
plaintiff wherein and whereby the said de-
fendants, Rio Tinto Copper Company, Og-
den C. Chase and S. F. Hunt, agreed to 
and with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff 
would assist the said Rio Tinto Copper 
Company in placing its treasury stock with 
his clients residing outside of Utah upon 
the aforesaid basis, the said defendants, 
Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C 
Chase, and S. F. Hunt, would transfer, 
convey, and deliver to the plaintiff 20,000 
shares of the Class A capital stock of the 
said Rio Tinto Copper Company after the 
aforesaid assessments or as many thereof 
as might be necessary, had been levied and 
paid; that the said Rio Tinto Copper Com-
pany levied one two-cent assessment and 
three one-cent assessments, assessment No. 
4 having been levied on or about the 17th 
day of March, 1932, and the collection of 
said assessment having been consummated 
on or about the 17th day of May, 1932; that 
pursuant to said agreement the plaintiff 
immediately commenced upon said work, 
circularized his said clients frequently and 
wrote personal letters to about one-hun-
dred twenty-five of his clients, such cir-
culars and letters all having been delivered 
outside of Utah, recommending the acquisi-
tion of the said stock of the said Rio Tinto 
€=>For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
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Copper Company upon the aforesaid basis, 
and as a result of the efforts of the plain-
tiff approximately 145,000 shares of stock 
were accepted by plaintiff's customers; 
that the plaintiff duly performed all things 
in said contract upon his part to be per-
formed." 
It is further alleged in the complaint 
that in October, 1932, defendant Mountain 
City Copper Company acquired all of the 
assets and property of the defendant Rio 
Tinto Copper Company, and in considera-
tion therefor agreed to exchange its stock 
share for share to the stockholders of the 
Rio Tinto Copper Company and to assume 
all contracts and liabilities of the Rio Tin-
to Copper Company; that plaintiff has 
made demand of defendants that they is-
sue to him the 20,000 shares of stock which 
they agreed to convey to him, but defen-
dants have failed and refused, and con-
tinue to refuse, to deliver the stock. Plain-
tiff prays judgment that defendants deliver 
the stock, or, if delivery thereof cannot 
be had, that he be awarded judgment for 
the value thereof. 
One of the principal questions of law up-
on which the parties divide is whether or 
not the alleged agreement relied upon by 
the plaintiff is or is not void. Defendants 
contend that the alleged agreement was 
and is unenforceable and void because in-
hibited by the provisions of Laws of Utah 
1925, c. 87, p. 171, which act is sometimes 
referred to as the Securities Act, and is 
commonly known as "the Blue Sky Law." 
Plaintiff contends that the agreement 
pleaded in his complaint did not involve 
a sale, and therefore was not within the 
provisions of the act. 
In the main, the present law touching 
the matter in hand is the same as it was 
at the time plaintiff alleges that he entered 
into the. agreement sued upon. Rev. St. 
Utah 1933, title 82, chap. 1, p. 981 (82-1-1 et 
seq.). We quote from chapter 87, Laws 
of Utah 1925, such provisions of the act 
as we deem bear upon this controversy: 
"When used in this Act the following 
terms shall, unless the text otherwise in-
dicates, have the following respective 
meanings: * * * 
"'Sale' or 'sell' shall include every dis-
position, or attempt to dispose, of a se-
curity or interest in a security for value. 
Any security given or delivered with, or 
as a bonus on account of, any purchase of 
securities or any other thing, shall be con-
clusively presumed to constitute a part of 
the subject of such purchase, and to have 
been sold for value. 'Sale' or 'sell' shall 
also include an exchange, an attempt to 
sell, an option of sale, a solicitation of sale, 
a subscription or an offer to sell, directly 
or by an agent, or a circular, letter, adver-
tisement or otherwise. 
" 'Dealer* shall include every person other 
than a salesman who in this State engages 
either for all or part of his time directly 
or through an agent in the business of sell-
ing any securities issued by another person 
or purchasing or otherwise acquiring such 
securities, from another for the purpose of 
reselling them or of ottering them for sale 
to the public, or offering, buying, selling or 
otherwise dealing or trading in securities as 
agent or principal for a commission or at 
a profit, or who deals in futures or differ-
ences in market quotations of prices or 
values of any securities or accepts margins 
on purchases or sales or pretended pur-
chases or sales of such securities provided 
that the word 'dealer* shall not include a 
person having no place of business in this 
State who sells or offers to sell securities 
exclusively to brokers or dealers actually 
engaged in buying and selling securities as 
a business. 
" 'Issuer* shall mean and include every 
person who proposes to issue, has issued, 
or shall hereafter issue any security, Any 
natural person who acts as a promoter for 
and on behalf of a corporation, trust or 
unincorporated association or partnership 
of any kind to be formed shall be deemed 
an issuer. 
"'Salesman' shall include every natural 
person, other than a dealer, employed or 
appointed or authorized by a dealer, or 
issuer to sell securities in any manner in 
this State. The partners of a partnership 
and the executive officers of a corporation 
or other association registered as a dealer 
shall not be salesmen within the meaning 
of this definition." Section 2. 
"All securities required by this Act to be 
registered before being sold in this State, 
and not entitled to registration by notifica-
tion shall be registered only by qualifica-
tion in the manner provided by this sec-
tion." Section 7. 
"No dealer or salesman shall engage in 
business in this State as such dealer or 
salesman or sell any securities including se-
curities exempted in Section 3 of this Act, 
except in transactions exempt under Sec-
tion 4, of this Act unless he has been reg-
istered as a dealer or salesman in the of-
ANDREWS v. CHASE 
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fice of the commission pursuant to the pro-
visions of this section." Section 10. 
"Any person, issuer, dealer, agent or 
salesman, who, not being at the time ex-
empt or registered pursuant to the provi-
sions of this Act, in any manner or 
by any means shall issue, sell, assign, 
transfer or offer to or negotiate for the 
issuance, sale or assignment, or transfer, 
of any securities said securities not being 
exempt or registered at the time of such 
issuance sale assignment or transfer, pur-
suant to the provisions of this Act, shall 
be guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than $100.00 or more than $10,000.00, 
or by imprisonment in the State prison for 
a term of not more than ten years, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment" Section 
27. 
[1] The stock here involved is not one 
of the kinds oi securities which are exempt 
from the provisions of the Securities Act. 
Appellant does not contend otherwise. What 
he does contend is that the act merely reg-
ulates the sale of securities and has no 
application whatever to securities which 
are given awayc It will be observed that 
"sale or sell" is defined as every disposi-
tion, or attempt to dispose, of a security 
or interest in a security for value. The 
words "for value" are descriptive of, and 
constitute a limitation on, the kind of 
transactions which the Securities Act was 
intended to regulate. It is a cardinal rule 
in the construction of a statute that, when 
possible, effect must be given to all of the 
language used in an act. If the Legisla-
ture had intended that the words "sale or 
sell" should include "gift or give," it would 
not have limited the former words to such 
disposals, or attempted disposals of se-
curities as are made for value. The second 
sentence of section 2, subd 3, further in-
dicates a legislative intention to limit the 
act to transactions where securities are 
disposed of for value. It provides that, if 
one security is transferred for value and 
another shall be given or delivered as a 
bonus, the latter "shall be conclusively 
presumed to constitute a part of the sub-
ject of such purchase." The provision of 
the act last quoted was evidently intend-
ed to prevent evasion of the act by one or 
more of the parties to a transaction in-
volving the transfer of security from con-
tending that such transfer was a gift in a 
transaction where the transferor may have 
received value for the stock disposed of 
by him. Had the lawmaking power in-
tended that the act should apply to gifts 
of securities, it would have been a simple 
matter to have so provided. In such case 
there would have been no occasion for the 
provision with respect to the giving or de-
livering of security as a bonus "on account 
of, any purchase of securities or any other 
thing," being "conclusively presumed to 
constitute a part of the subject of such 
purchase." 
It will also be observed that the provi-
sions of the act defining a dealer, an issuer, 
and a salesman are confined to those who 
have to do with the disposal of securities 
by means of a sale, and is silent as to such 
persons as may participate in the disposal 
of securities by gift. So also the only 
securities which the act requires to be reg-
istered are such as "shall be sold within 
this State." Section 5. To hold that the act 
applies to securities which are given awa> 
would be to read into the act a meaning 
which is not expressed or implied by the 
language used. On the contrary, the clear 
implication to be drawn from a number of 
the provisions of the act is that gifts of se-
curities were not intended to be covered 
by the act 
[2-6] It will be noted that it is in sub-
stance alleged in the complaint that plain-
tiff was employed to assist in giving the 
stock of the defendant Rio Tinto Copper 
Company to such members of the public 
as were willing to accept it; that the stock 
was so given with the understanding that 
the company would levy assessments for 
the development of its mine, but that the 
persons securing the same were under no 
obligation to pay such assessments. It is 
contended by respondents that in giving 
away the stock with the knowledge that as-
sessments would be levied thereon, and with 
the hope that such assessments would be 
paid by the donees, was, within the mean-
ing of the Securities Act, an attempt to 
sell the stock. If, in the transaction under 
review, the transferees had agreed to pay 
the future assessments when levied, it 
would seem reasonably clear that the 
transaction would have been a sale. The 
allegations of the complaint, however, al-
lege that there was no such agreement In 
the absence of an agreement to pay as-
sessments, the transferees of the stock 
were not obligated to pay the assessments. 
The law is settled in this jurisdiction that, 
when the articles of incorporation provide 
that the stockholders thereof shall not be 
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liable for the corporate debts, the owner or-in the results.therein reached. Hence! 
of ,full paid stock of such corporation is this dissent. 
not liable for an unpaid assessment. ..The ; . A , s t a t e d i n ^prevail ing opinionAthel 
qnly means of enforcing the assessment is
 d e m u r r e r s o f ^ defendants to the^c^J 
by„a sale of the stock or so much thereof ^
 w e r e s u s t a i n e < L Thc pontiff Vavf 
asbmay be necessary to j>ay the assess- ^ e k c t e d t o s t a f l d o n h i s c o m p l a i m v l j £ 
? J ? V H2tS°? y,: Hoggan,.44 Utah, 295 case was dismissed. Plaintiff appeals^Th'e 
140 P. 128. In light of the allegations of ^ ^
 o n ^ , a r e m e r e f o r e d e t f i -
the comRlaint that the persons to whom the
 m i n c d b y t h e s u f f i c i o f ± t allegation? 
stock was given assumed no liability to pay
 o f A e complaint -,rTUJ 
assessments, it is to be assumed the articles ' "-78 
of incorporation of the defendant Rio Tin- It " assumed by the plaintiff, and 'also 
to Copper Company' contain a provision °y the prevailing opinion that it is alleged^ 
that the stockholders thereof were not li- m t h e complaint that the defendants wert 
able for its debts. Such a provision is making gifts of the capital stock of-the" 
usually contained in the articles of incor- Rio Tinto Copper Company to such men# 
pbration of mining companies. If the al- *>ers of the public as would accept the 
legations of the complaint are true, which » m e- In my opinion, the allegation of th«; 
we must assume for the purpose of demur- complaint does not justify such conclusioa< 
rer, it follows that there was neither a sale I"1"5 complaint merely asserts that the cbpi 
nor an attempt to sell the stock in question. P«" company "was desirous of giving some 
X'mere hope or anticipation that the trans- 9* >« shares of stock to such members ,of 
ferees of the stock would pay the assess- the P«»hc as would receive it upon t h e ^ 
ments if and when levied may not be'said derstanding that the Rio Tmto Coppejc 
ttf be a disposition or an attempt to dis- Company, would for the purpose of carry* 
pose of the stock "for value within the »ng on development of said property0lev^ 
* Counsel for the respective parties have - » « * o f "f m m m * P[°Perty *ad ™ # $ « ! 
kV,considerable -length argued two other understanding that .Ae persons recemne 
questions, viz.: Assuming the transaction **>* s t o c k w e r e n o t ° b h ? e d *° W snch.as^ 
alleged in the complaint was a sale within • « » » « « or any of them.' Nowhere^is 
the meaning of the Securities Act, may «™« any allegation of any intention^ 
the defendants avail themselves of such *»** * *!*» n°T. , s ^ " J *P?WSSt 
fact to escape liability? Was the trans- from whlch su<A mtention may be mferred j; 
action alleged in the complaint interstate n o r » t h e ? a i \ y allegation from which t^ 
commerce and as such not subject to the *?? b e m f e r r c d that »ny k™d °.f d e h ^ c ^ 
provisions of the Act? Having reached o f t h e "ockwould be made prior to the 
the conclusion that the transaction as al- P*?11"" °* * « assessments to be levied, ft 
leged by plaintiff is not covered by the pro- 1S ^conceivable to assume that the stock 
visions of the Securities Act, it becomes certificates would be executed and issued 
unnecessary to determine the other ques- promiscuously to any and every person 
tions presented. We therefore express no who might be on plaintiffs nailing list, or 
opinion concerning them. From what has *? w h o m a certificate could be sent by .the 
been said, it follows that the judgment s m , P l e process of depositing the .same m 
dismissing the action should be, and it the mails. The fair inference is that, if 
accordingly is, reversed. s t o c k certificates were issued at all, they 
_ , . . , . . . . . were only issued to those particular per-
This cause is remanded to the district
 s o n s w h o w o u l d a t t h e known* 
court of Salt Lake county with directions ^ „
 w o u l d h a v e w M m u c h „ 
to reinstate the action and overrule the
 five c e n t s s h a r e i f ^ w e r e t o k c e p 
demurrers. Appellant is awarded his costs. ^
 $ t o c L E v c n s u c h a n a r r a n g e m e a t 
~;FOLLAND, MOFFAT, and WOLFE, could in no sense be distorted into a. gift, 
IT concur granting a sufficient delivery, as there 
. " would still be lacking the necessary inten-' 
EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice (dissent- tion by the copper company to make a gift 
ing). - "A clear and unmistakable intention oil 
I am unable to concur either in the the part of the donor to make a gift of his 
views expressed in the prevailing opinion property is an essential requisite of a gift 
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inter vivos. *And this intention must be 
inconsistent with any other theory." 28 
C. J. 627, § 19. 
The only word in the complaint which 
might characterize the transaction as a gift 
is the word "giving." This word has no 
fixed' and definite meaning, so that the 
mere use of it would necessarily make a 
sufficient allegation of the ultimate fact 
of a gift. While the primary meaning of 
the word "give" is to bestow a gratuity, 
yet it also has a secondary meaning, widely 
and frequently employed in ordinary busi-
ness and other transactions. In Smith v. 
Burnet, 35 N. J. Eq. 314, at page 324, the 
court says: "The question arises whether 
it appears that such possession was deliver-
ed with an intention to confer upon him 
dominion over the stock as the absolute 
owner thereof. Proof of such an intent is 
absolutely essential to support the gift * * * 
The word 'give' is often used with other 
meaning than as evincing an intent to con-
fer the title in the thing delivered" 
In Johnston v. Griest, 85 Ind. 503, the 
plaintiff sued upon a writing which read: 
"This will certify that I do give to Charles 
E. Johnston $100, the money to be paid as 
soon as my financial condition will allow; 
and
 4if I , do not live to pay it, I wish it 
paid out of my estate," This was held to 
be a promise to make a gift and not a prom-
ise to pay. The court said: "The word 
'give' does not always signify a mere 
gratuitous act; at all events it is not one 
of those words which have a fixed and 
unalterable meaning," Galloway v. Jen-
kms5 63 N. C. 147; Spencer v0 Potter's 
L state, 85 V t 1, 80 A. 821. In Revere Oil 
Co, v. Bank of Chillicothe (Tex, Civ. 
App.) 255 So W. 219, and in Southern 
Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 
S6 E. 67, the words "giving" and "give" 
were construed to be synonymous with 
"delivering" and "deliver" respectively. 
In Crews v. Crews (Mo. Sup.) 240 S. W. 
149, 151, it was contended that the word 
"give" in a will permitting the executrix 
to "give such o'f my children at such 
time as she may think proper such of my 
property as she may think just and right," 
necessarily implies a gratuity. The court 
said: "Such, however, is not the case. 
Even if the word 'give* does generally 
mean a gift or gratuity, it depends en-
tirely upon the circumstances and the con-
text as to whether that meaning should be 
attached to i t The word is used to mean 
'deliver/ 'supply/ 'grant/ 'furnish/ 'pay/ 
'convey.' * * * We have been unable to find 
any case where it is held that the term 
necessarily implies a gratuity or a gift 
without consideration. On the other hand, 
there are cases where it is held that it does 
not, necessarily pimply want of considera-
tion. * * * The word must be considered in 
the light of circumstances,," 
As a further aid to the proper con-
struction of the complaint, the provisions 
of our Constitution and statutes relative 
to the issuance of corporate stock should 
be considered. Article 12, § 5, of our Con-
stitution provides: "Corporations shall not 
issue stock, except to bona fide subscribers 
thereof or their assignee. * * * All 
fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness 
shall be void." The clear purpose of this 
provision is to prevent the issuance of "wa-
tered stock" and to assure that no corporate 
stock will be issued without receiving 
something of value therefor. The import 
of plaintiff's complaint and his contentions 
before *this court are that the persons re-
ceiving the copper company's stock were 
in no sense subscribers thereto. Indeed, 
a
 udonee {of ; stock from the corporation 
could not be a bona fide subscriber there-
for. -.In die case of Frame v. Mahoney, 21 
Ariz,c0282t ;187,.RtJ584, 586, the Arizona 
Supreme . Court construed a provision of 
t{ie • Arizona Constitution identical with 
ours. It said: "A bona fide subscriber is 
one who actually turns over to the corpora-
tion * something -of value in lieu of the 
stock issued to him." 
In a later case, Overlock v. Jerome-
Portland Copper Min, Coo, 29 Arizc 560, 
243 P. 400, 401, the same court, after quot-
ing the same constitutional provision, 
says: "A proper construction of the lan-
guage quoted doubtless would be that the 
stock in the hands of Frame should be an-
nulled, since he paid nothing for it and 
was not a bona fide subscriber. * * * The 
evident purpose of the clause, which says, 
'No corporation shall issue stock, except to 
bona fide subscribers therefor or their 
assignees/ was to prevent the issuance of 
stock except to parties who paid for it at 
its face value, and was intended more for 
the protection of creditors of the corpora-
tion than otherwise. This same provision 
is found in the Constitutions of Washing-
ton and Utah, and if we rightly understand 
their courts, that is their view. Gordon 
v. Cummings, 78 Wash. 515, 139 P. 489; 
Rolapp v. Ogden, etc, R. Co., 37 Utah, 540, 
110 P. 364." 
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#fThe Constitution; of the-rstate*of Wash-
ington also"'contains a provision identical 
with our provision above quoted. In the 
case of Gordon v. Cummings, 78 -Wash., 
515, 139 P. 489, 494, the court of that state 
held that the r"holders of unpaid stock 
cannot defeat an action for the balance 
due by claiming that they hold such stock 
as a mere gratuity." The court further 
s a V 4 ? : 
*> "Indeed, it seems to us that the fram-
ers of the Constitution of this state antici-
pated, and intended to prevent, just such 
frauds on the law as was here attempted. 
'Corporations shall not issue stock, except 
to bona fide subscribers therefor, or their 
assignees.' Article 12, § 6. If this means 
anything, it is that one who takes the 
stock of a corporation is liable for its value 
.and that a subscription that is not made in 
good faith is no subscription.' * * * 
^'Within the limit of the authorized 
Capital stock, no person can hold a. share 
^Si the stock, by whatever name'it'-may be 
^called, *without meeting the responsibilities 
Jand the liabilities that the law attaches to 
such "* holding^ _u To ^ hold otherwise' "would 
^defeat the very'purpose of the law*; for it 
would * then be possible,* by "adopting the 
•very plan that was adopted in this case, to 
make all but a-nominal number of the 
shares of the capital stock unresponsive 
to the liability put upon it by law." 
" ,This court in the case of Rolapp v. Og-
(ten & N. W. R/Ca, 37 Utah, 540, 110 P. 
364, has indicated a construction of our 
constitutional provision and the statutes 
of the state in harmony with the forego^ 
ing principles. After quoting said provi-
s i o n and referring to those sections of 
our statutes which are now sections 18-2-6, 
18-2-7, and 18-2-13, Rev. St Utah 1933, 
Mr. Justice Frick says: "If we keep in 
mind all of our own constitutional and 
statutory provisions, we think it is mani-
fest that it was the intention both of the 
people who adopted the Constitution and 
the Legislature who passed the foregoing 
sections that the capital stock of corpora-
tions excepting those created for mining 
and irrigation, shall represent full actual 
value either in money or property, and 
further, that the subscribers for stock 
shall pay 100 cents on the dollar, or its 
equivalent, for the stock subscribed for by 
them, and until so paid that they are liable 
to creditors of the corporation in a prop-
er "proceeding for any balance remaining 
'unpaid on their subscriptions. No doubt 
when stojek is once 'full paid,' whetherfin; 
moneyf pfroperty, or labor, it may be boughti 
and sold at any price, but commercial o^Y^  
business Corporations in this state may notv 
issue stock to their subscribers formless" 
than the face value thereof, which musf'be' 
paid fon either in money or property^ 
"> Fletcher, in Cyclopedia of Corporation^ 
vol. 11, § 5202, says: "For a corporation 
to issue its stock as a gratuity violates the' 
rights of existing stockholders who do not 
consent, and is a fraud upon subsequent 
subscribers, and upon subsequent creditors' 
who dea^  with it on the faith of its capital* 
stock." 
It is clear that the issuance and delivery 
of its corporate stock by a corporation 
gratuitously and without any consideration 
violates the constitutional and statutory^ 
provisions of this state. Under plaintifFsr 
theory,r.a!l of the copper company's capital* 
stock could have been given away, develop-' 
ment wojrk done, and debts incurred .with 
no one lijable or responsible for the bbliga-| 
tions this incurred. Such a proceeding* 
would be|, in my opinion, directly contrary 
to' the~ law of this state. It is not neces*] 
sary for us to determine, in this case,' fiow~S 
ever, whjat the legal effect of such viola"^  
tion would be as between the holders^of, 
stock and others. It is sufficient to n6t£ 
that plaintiffs theory is based entirely"uj& 
on such a violation on the part of the cop^ 
per company, and he is asking us to give 
his complaint that effect It is elementary 
that an agreement will not be construed as 
involving the performance of something 
forbidden by law when it is open to a con-
struction that does not involve such viola-
tion. As I have already stated, the com-
plaint here in question does not allege a gift' 
by appropriate and sufficient allegations as 
to either1 of the essential elements of in-
tention oir delivery, and it is not within our 
province to make any inferences that would 
lead to a result which the law prohibits. 
We musj: assume, therefore, that the de-
fendants were disposing, or attempting to 
dispose, of the stock of the copper com-
pany for value. Consequently, it is my 
opinion that the word "giving" must be 
construe^, not as indicating a gratuity, but 
as synonymous with "delivering." 
In view of the foregoing conclusions, it 
becomes necessary to consider the word 
"assessment" as used in the complaint The 
transactipns involved in the complaint oc-
curred in 1931 and 1932, before the enacP 
ment of the Revised Statutes of 1933. The, 
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plaintiff and the prevailing opinion assume 
that this word, as used in the complaint, 
necessarily refers to assessements levied 
on full paid stock. However, that is not 
the case The provisions of sections 900, 
901, 902, and 905, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
as amended in the 1921 Session Laws, c. 
22 p. 71, and sections 903, 904, and 919, 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, were then in effect. 
The word "assessment" is there used to de-
note a "call" upon subscribed and unpaid 
stock as well as an assessment on full paid 
stock, and the same procedure is provided 
for the collection of both kinds of "as-
sessments/' In either case the stock may 
be sold to pay the assessment Stock thus 
sold passes to the purchaser or the cor-
poration, as the case may be. As to an 
"assessment" on unpaid stock, at least, un-
der section 919, the company can waive the 
sale and sue to collect the delinquent "as-
sessment." The corporation has the option 
to sell the stock or proceed by suit to col-
lect on the promise to pay. Having such 
option, it could agree with a subscriber 
that it would look exclusively to the sale, 
and no express or implied promise to pay 
the "assessments" need be made. 14 C. J. 
537, § 803. A sale and forfeiture of the 
stock would preclude- any action against' 
the subscriber under such conditions. 14 
C J. 650, § 989, Rev. S t 1933, 18-4-1 et 
seq., makes the distinction between "calls" 
and "assessments" and uses the words in 
their respective meanings. It will also be 
noted that section 919 is omitted entirely, 
and that on a sale of stock for a "call" 
the purchaser becomes liable for the sub-
sequent and unpaid "calls." 
Since the word "assessment" has a dual 
meaning, as indicated and since admittedly 
no consideration for the stock was to be 
given at the time plaintiff's customers 
should indicate their willingness to accept 
it, or even after it was delivered, if de-
livered before the assessments were levied, 
and since no gift of title to the stock can 
be inferred from the allegations of the 
complaint, it necessarily follows that the 
"assessments" contemplated were in effect 
"calls," which the copper company was 
authorized to make and which the holders 
of the stock must pay to obtain and keep 
title theretOe This conclusion is borne out 
by an analysis of the complaint The "as-
sessments" are limited to four in number, 
and each is for a particular amount As 
to creditors, at least, the company could 
not agree in advance that upon the issue 
of fully paid but assessable stock it would 
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or could levy only certain specified assess-
ments. Especially would this be true where 
such agreement was made with only certain 
persons who acquired the assessable stock. 
It is not to be inferred from the complaint 
that the only persons who acquired the 
assessable stock of the copper company 
were those who had this understanding 
concerning these four assessments. There 
is nothing in the complaint that would 
warrant ftie conclusion that the copper 
company was disposing of its assessable 
stock only through the method by which 
plaintiff operated. It is not shown that 
his assistance or employment was exclusive 
and that the assessable stock was not to 
be disposed of by other means. In my 
opinion, however, it must be inferred 
that the four stipulated assessments were 
to be levied only on the stock issued 
or to be issued according to said under-
standing under which plaintiff operated. 
The only legitimate construction that can 
be placed upon the arrangement thus 
pleaded, therefore, is that upon the pay-
ment of these "assessments" or "calls" the 
stock would be deemed fully paid for. 
From what has been said it is clear that 
the disposition of the copper company's 
stock, as alleged, would be a sale for value 
within the definition of that term as stated 
in chapter 89, Laws of Utah 1925, as amend-
ed by chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1929, 
commonly called the Blue Sky Law, Cer-
tainly such disposition was an attempt to 
dispose of a security for value* It may be 
conceded that a gift of stock does not 
come within the purview of the Blue Sky 
Law. But, as herein shown, to call the 
arrangement described in the complaint a 
bestowing of gratuitous issues of stock, is 
begging the question and fails to distin-
guish between form and substance. If 
this court gives legal sanction to such a 
plain and palpable attempt to evade the in-
tent and purpose of our constitutional and 
statutory provisions, then indeed will the 
doors be wide open to every one who may 
resort to the specious expedient of making 
"gifts" of stock. The law would be nulli-
fied; the legislative regulations intended to 
protect the public would be inoperative; 
and additional impetus would be given to 
the ever present tendency to invent means 
to circumvent such regulations. 
It must be conceded that the stock here 
involved is not exempt from the provi-
sions of the Blue Sky Law. Before it 
could be sold, as defined by the law, it 
must have been registered with the State 
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Securities Commission. There are no al-
legations in the complaint showing that the 
stock disposed of was so registered. 
It does not appear from the complaint 
that the plaintiff was a dealer as defined by 
chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1929. But it is 
alleged that plaintiff was to "assist the said 
Rio Tinto Copper Company in placing its 
treasury stock with his clients residing out-
side of Utah" upon the basis heretofore 
explained; that, as a result of plaintiffs 
efforts, approximately 145,000 snares of 
stock were accepted by his customers. Un-
der such allegations he would come clearly 
within the definition of "agent"; it being 
established that the transactions thus in-
volved constituted "sales" within the statu-
tory definition. Under section lOx, c 79, 
Laws Utah 1929, "no person shall engage 
in business in this State as such agent 
to. sell any securities of an issuer as set 
forth in this Act unless he has paid a fee 
of five dollars ($5.00) and has been regis-
tered as an agent in the office of the com-
mission pursuant to the provisions of this 
chapter. Every agent before selling, offer-
ing to sell or advertising the sale of any 
security of an issuer under the provisions 
of this Act shall file in the office of the 
commission an application for registration 
in writing," etc Section 27 of chapter 87, 
Laws of Utah 1925, makes it a felony for 
an unregistered dealer, salesman, or agent 
to sell, or offer for sale, or negotiate for 
the sale of, unregistered securities. 
Plaintiff is suing for the compensation 
he claims he earned in assisting in the dis-
position of the copper company's stock. He 
does not allege that he was registered as 
required by the provisions above quoted. 
In my opinion, having failed to allege that 
the stock which plaintiff assisted in dispos-
ing of was not registered, and having fail-
ed to allege that he himself was registered, 
plaintiff has failed to state a cause of ac-
tion. 
The Blue Sky Law was enacted for the 
protection of the public It specifically 
provides that corporate securities must be 
registered before being sold or offered for 
sale, and every dealer, salesman, or agent 
must be registered before selling: or offer-
ing to sell such securities. Selling unreg-
istered securities by an unregistered per-
son is made a felony. Even though the 
statute does not expressly so provide, it 
must follow that any contract which plain-
tiff may have had with defendants made 
in violation of such provisions is utterly 
void. Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery 
Co., 61 Utah, 22, 210 P. 201; Levinson v. 
Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P. 825, 12 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 575, 11 Ann. Cas. 661; Payne v. 
De Vaughn, 77 Cal. App. 399, 246 P. 
1069; McKinlay v. Javan Mines Co., 42 
Idaho, 770, 248 P. 473; McManus v. Ful-
ton, 85 Mont 170, 278 P. 126, 130, 67 A. 
L. R. 690; Zerr v. Lawlor (Tex. Civ. 
App.) 300 S. W. 112; Brandenburg v. Mi-
ley Petroleum Exploration Co. (D. C.) 16 
F. (2d) 933. To permit plaintiff to recover 
in this case would be to give legal sanc-
tion to, and enforce, an illegal contract. 
This the courts will not do. They will 
not aid either party to such a contract 
Though it may be said that it illy becomes 
a defendant to take advantage of such il-
legality, yet such defense is allowed, and 
the courts, even sua sponte, will take cog-
nizance thereof, not for the benefit of 
either party, but for the public good and 
for the maintenance of their own dignity 
and the laws of the state. As stated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the case of McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 
U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct 839, 851, 43 L. Ed. 
1117: "To refuse to grant either party to 
an illegal contract judicial aid for the en-
forcement of his alleged rights under it 
tends strongly towards reducing the num-
ber of such transactions to a minimum. The 
more plainly parties understand that when 
they enter into contracts of this nature 
they place themselves outside the protec-
tion of the law, so far as that protection 
consists in aiding them to enforce such 
contracts, the less inclined will they be to 
enter into them. In that way the public se-
cures the benefit of a rigid adherence to 
the law." 
Because section 18, c 79, p. 140, Laws of 
Utah 1929, amends the original act and 
makes a sale in violation of the act void-
able at the election of the purchaser, can 
be of no assistance to plaintiff in this case 
His rights do not depend upon whether 
the purchaser may or may not make such 
election. As stated in McManus v. Ful-
ton, supra: "The provisions that the sale 
shall be void at the election of the pur-
chaser does not in any wise detract from 
the criminal character of the prohibited 
act on part of the seller. * * * Under the 
law a contract between the seller and the 
purchaser was voidable at the option of the 
purchaser; but that has no relation what-
ever to a contract between the issuer and 
the agent, solicitor, or broker, or between 
the agents of the issuer; such, in the ah 
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sence of a compliance with the Act, is 
wholly void." 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the 
foregoing principles by arguing that the 
sales of stock took place outside the state 
of Utah and were made in interstate com-
merce, and therefore were not subject to 
our Blue Sky Law. As to the first con-
tention, it is utterly impossible to conclude 
from the allegations of the complaint that 
the sales were actually made outside the 
state of Utah. All that appears is that 
plaintiffs customers resided outside this 
state and that his correspondence went be-
yond its boundaries. Plaintiff simply ad-
vised his customers and assisted in the 
sales. The inference is that, after being 
advised by plaintiff to accept the stock, his 
correspondents made some kind of com-
munication with the copper company, indi-
cating a desire to accept a certain amount 
of its stock. The company's office was 
here It would here determine whether 
to accept such application, so that the last 
act necessary to complete the contract 
would necessarily occur here. This would 
make it a Utah contract. United States 
Bond & Finance Corporation v. National 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Utah, 62, 12 P. 
(2d) 758, 17 P. (2d) 238. 
Such a transaction would not necessarily 
be one in interstate commerce. Plaintiffs 
solicitations and advisory letters formed no 
part of the sale contract. They were 
simply the procuring cause which induced 
the making of the contract and the conse-
quent sale. For plaintiff to avoid the ef-
fect of the laws of this state under the 
theory that what he did and what was done 
between his customers and the copper com-
pany involved interstate commerce, it was 
his duty to allege sufficient facts to bring 
himself within the principles thus sought 
to be invoked. There are no such allega-
tions in the complaint now before us, even 
assuming that corporate stock is an article 
subject to interstate commerce, a question 
not herein decided. There are no allega-
tions as to when or where delivery of 
the stock was made or that the sales neces-
sarily involved the use of interstate com-
merce to complete the same. It is there-
fore not necessary to discuss further this 
phase of the case. It is my opinion that 
the trial court committed no error in sus-
taining defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs 
complaint and in dismissing such complaint 
upon plaintiffs failure to further plead. 
The judgment of the trial court, therefore, 
should be sustained. 
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Addendum. 
ELIAS HANSEN, Chief Justice. 
The view is expressed in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice Ephraim Hanson 
that the complaint is fatally defective in 
that it affirmatively appears that the al-
leged transaction relied upon by plaintiff 
for recovery contravenes the provisions of 
article 12, § 5, of the Constitution of Utah, 
and certain statutory provisions calculated 
to give effect to such constitutional provi-
sions. The argument is made that the 
Rio Tinto Copper Company was, as a mat-
ter of law, precluded from giving away 
any of its treasury stock. That such is the 
law generally may readily be conceded. 
It is, however, an easy matter to conceive 
of exceptions to the general rule. An il-
lustration will serve to make clear what 
we have in mind. Thus, if owners of min-
ing property desire to create a corporation 
for the purpose of developing their prop-
erty, and, instead of having issued to 
themselves shares of capital stock of the 
corporation in payment for mining claims 
conveyed to the corporation, they conclude, 
and so provide in the articles of incorpora-
tion, that some of the stocks shall be held 
by the corporation and later given away 
as directed by the incorporators, such an 
arrangement may not be said to offend 
against the provisions of the Constitution 
or the laws referred to in the dissenting 
opinion* In such case neither the corpora-
tion nor the creditors thereof would have 
any just cause to complain because the 
stock was transferred to the donees rather 
than to the incorporators. Plaintiff, in the 
absence of a showing to the contrary, had 
a right to assume that the defendant Rio 
Tinto Copper Company had authority to 
perform its alleged contract The com-
plaint here brought in question is silent 
as to what was or what was not contained 
in the articles of incorporation of the de-
fendant Rio Tinto Copper Company at the 
time complained of. Courts do not take 
judicial notice of such matters. If the 
defendants, or either of them, desire to 
interpose the defense that the defendant 
Rio Tinto Copper Company was without 
authority to enter into the alleged con-
tract here sued upon, they may do so by 
answer The complaint does not affirma-
tively show that such a defense is avail-
able to defendants. 
Moreover, this action was brought against 
the personal defendants Ogden C. Chase 
and S. F. Hunt as well as the corporation 
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defendants. It is alleged in the complaint 
that the contract sued upon was made with 
the Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C. 
Chase, and S. F. Hunt. The mere fact that 
the defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company 
may be precluded from giving away its 
stock would not preclude plaintiff from re-
covering, from the personal defendants, 
compensation for services lawfully render-
ed pursuant to the contract of employment. 
Even though the defense of ultra vires is 
available to the defendant company0, it is 
difficult to perceive how such a defense is 
available to the individual defendants. The 
contract declared on is for services alleged 
to have been rendered and not for the en-
forcement of a promise to make a gift. 
No provision of law would be broken and 
no public policy would be infringed by the 
individual defendants paying plaintiff for 
lawful services. If, therefore, the pur-
poses sought to be accomplished by the 
contract of employment were lawful, the 
individual defendants would not be reliev-
ed from liability merely because the de-
fendant company may have exceeded its 
authority in entering into the alleged con-
tract. In this connection it may be noted 
that the defendants do not attack the com-
plaint either by their demurrer or in their 
briefs upon the ground that the complaint 
shows on its face that the defendant Rio 
Tinto Copper Company exceeded its 
authority in entering into the alleged con-
tract of employment 
The position is also taken in the dissent-
ing opinion that the allegations in the com-
plaint do not affirmatively show that no 
consideration was to be paid for the stock 
other than, and in addition to, the allega-
tions with respect to the levy of future as-
sessments. Apparently counsel for the re-
spondents do not so construe the allega-
tions of the complaint The cause was 
argued on the theory that the transaction 
set out in the complaint constituted a gift 
unless the allegations with respect to the 
understanding as to future assessments 
made it otherwise. Counsel for the parties 
having so construed the complaint and 
having based their argument on such con-
struction, we should dispose of the ques-
tion presented for review upon such theory, 
unless the language of the complaint de-
mands a different construction. Moreover, 
plaintiff was not required to negative the 
possibility that the contract sued upon is 
beyond any attack that may be urged 
against it upon the ground that it is illegal. 
Where a contract is shown to have been 
entered into, it will be presumed to be 
binding upon the parties unless it affirma-
tively appears otherwise. 
"Where the language of an instrument 
in writing or the facts of a transaction are 
of a character to leave in some doubt what 
the party thereto intended should be the 
precise nature of the legal effect thereof, 
the contract is not to be so construed as to 
render it invalid if it is reasonably suscep-
tible of construction that will render it 
valid. If reasonably possible the contract 
will be so construed as to make it lawful. 
It will not be presumed that the parties 
intended to violate the law." 2 Elliott on 
Contracts, p. 796, § 1520. 
So, also, the general rule is that: "The 
law does not presume that parties to a con-
tract intend by it to accomplish an illegal 
object, but it rather presumes that they in-
tend to accomplish a legal purpose." 
The complaint does not show upon its 
face that the transfer of the stock to the 
transferees was a sale within the meaning 
of the act 
LOWE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. 
No. 5645. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 7, 1935. 
1. Master and servant <S»398 
Employee's failure to file application for 
compensation with Industrial Commission 
within one year from date of accident and 
Injury held to bar his claim for compensation 
unless failure was otherwise excused (Rev. 
St 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.; 104-2-26).i 
2. Master and servant <S»4I7(7) 
Findings of Industrial Commission based 
upon conflicting evidence that employer was 
not estopped to rely upon employee's failure 
to file application for compensation within pe-
riod of limitation, and that employee had not 
been mentally incompetent during year fol-
lowing accident and injury, so as to excuse 
failure, held binding upon the Supreme Court 
$s»For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER fn all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
iBodrique* Y. Industrial Commission (Utah) 43 P.(2d) 189. 
